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Community-driven development (CDD) 
has long been embraced by international 
development partners as a means of 
delivering public goods and strengthening 
social capital and cohesion, particularly in 
fragile contexts. To receive external support, 
CDD projects often require co-financing 
from communities through informal taxes – 
non-market payments that are not required 
or defined by state law and are enforced 
outside the state legal system. Co-financing 
is often incentivised through CDD grants, 
with the requirement for informal taxes 
largely justified based on the belief that they 
will create a greater sense of ownership over 
projects and increase their sustainability.
However, despite being widely embraced by 
development partners and donors and being 
incorporated into CDD programmes, there is 
limited evidence about the impact of co- financing 
requirements. First, it is unclear whether CDD 
programmes can incentivise informal revenue 
generation and local collective action.
Second, though it is often assumed that 
matching grant programmes requiring 
community contributions will lead to more 
positive public goods outcomes than external 
aid alone, there is little evidence of this 
outcome in practice. Meanwhile, reviews 
of CDD programmes highlight the risk of 
elite capture of programmes, while it is 
plausible that local revenue requirements 
lead to coercive revenue-raising tactics, with 
revenue used primarily to benefit local elites. 
Third, little is known about the impact of 
requiring co-financing through informal 
community contributions for state and 
non-state governance actors. It is not clear 
whether co-financing requirements serve to 
‘crowd out’ other forms of formal and informal 
revenue-raising, and whether working with 
informal taxing institutions outside the state 
negatively affects state legitimacy. 
Research design and data
We explored these research gaps through a 
randomised control trial of a CDD programme 
in Gedo region in south-central Somalia, 
which made use of matching grants to 
incentivise informal contributions for local 
public goods. This CDD programme was 
implemented by two NGOs and involved two 
interventions: a grant, matching or surpassing 
revenue raised informally by communities, 
and a set of measures aimed at increasing 
oversight over communities’ management of 
informal revenue, including using an online 
contribution and payment tracking platform. 
We rely on household survey data collected 
from 1297 respondents in 31 communities 
that received these interventions (treatment 
communities) and 31 communities that did not 
(control communities), before and after the 
programme implementation. We also make 
use of repeated surveys with village leaders 
and collect objective assessments of the 
programme’s impact through observable data 
like the quality of community development 
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projects built through the programme and rely on 
the digital payment tracking platform to cross-
check reported contributions.
Positive effects on informal 
contributions to public goods
First, we found the CDD programme in Gedo 
region was effective in incentivising informal 
taxation within communities. Treatment 
communities were more likely than control 
communities to undertake a new development 
project and to raise new informal revenue to 
finance public goods. Importantly, the matching 
grants did not crowd out other forms of informal 
revenue-raising, which play an important role in 
social welfare provision in south-central Somalia. 
Positive effects on the quality 
of public goods
Second, the programme was also effective in 
delivering better quality public goods outcomes. 
Individuals in treatment communities were 
more likely to be satisfied with the public 
goods outcomes and to perceive greater fiscal 
reciprocity of informal contributions, supported by 
more positive objective assessments of the new 
community development projects. These findings 
are somewhat surprising given the risks of elite 
capture associated with CDD programmes. 
We believe they can be explained in part 
through the mechanisms of accountability that 
were embedded within the transparent and 
participatory programme design. For example, 
individuals in treatment communities were more 
likely to perceive their rights to make demands 
on local leaders and to play a role in monitoring 
local revenues and projects. 
Positive effects on perceptions 
of state and non-state 
governance actors
Finally, we show that the CDD programme with 
co-financing requirements did not undermine 
perceptions of the legitimacy of the local state 
and some non-state governance actors. Instead, 
citizen perceptions of the legitimacy of the local 
government – their willingness to accept the 
authority of the local government to levy taxes – 
increased as a result of the programme. 
This is striking, particularly as the local 
government had no direct role in the CDD 
programme. In exploring the mechanisms 
through which these outcomes emerge, we 
find no evidence of the project being falsely 
attributed to the government, partial evidence 
that legitimacy was strengthened through more 
frequent interactions with leaders, and strong 
evidence that the positive relationship emerged 
through shifts in perception of the transparency, 
trust and performance of local leaders. 
This indicates that where informal revenue 
generation helps to finance valued public goods, 
taxpayers may view state actors as doing their 
job even if they do not have a direct role in the 
financing or delivery of public goods. 
Implications 
This paper contributes to the relatively limited 
evidence base in this area, and contrasts with 
concerns that co-financed CDD programmes 
can lead to elite capture or that operating outside 
formal institutional channels can undermine 
the state. Our findings suggest that matching 
grants may be effectively used to incentivise 
informal contributions that are enforced through 
social mechanisms. The positive spillover 
effects on state actors points to a potential 
complementarity between informal taxing 
institutions, external financing and the state in a 
context of weak state institutional capacity. 
These findings also have important implications 
for how development partners deliver aid and 
engage with informal taxing actors outside the 
state in contexts of weak formal statehood. In 
Somalia, international development partners 
and donors often rely on local leaders and 
informal institutions to deliver services and 
aid in the region, though are simultaneously 
invested in strengthening formal state capacity 
and reach throughout the country. Our evidence 
suggests that development partners may work 
with communities and community leaders to 
co-finance development without necessarily 
undermining state actors – and potentially 
actually strengthen the state’s legitimacy. 
Despite these possibilities, we highlight 
continued and significant risks of requiring 
co- financing within CDD programmes, including 
the important risks of a lack of accountability 
of local leaders, the exclusion of minorities 
and sub-populations, the reinforcement of 
inequitable public goods financing, and the 
entrenchment of non-universal conceptions of 
citizenship and rights.
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